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Abstract 
Usually, market models analyse competition between firms with either quantity or price as decision’s variables. This 
paper considers mixed duopoly competitions in which a state-owned public firm and a private firm produce 
complementary goods. We analyse, separately, the model in which the state-owned public firm sets the price and the 
private firm chooses the output production; and the model in which the state-owned public firm sets the output 
production and the private firm chooses the price. By considering domestic and international models, we analyse the 
effects of opening the market to a foreign firm. We also compare the results obtained with different types of decision 
variables. This paper contributes to the understanding of the implications of firms’ decisions on social welfare. As a 
result, the paper shows that, in the domestic competition, social welfare is higher when the state-owned public firm 
sets price and the domestic private firm sets production outputs than in other competitions. Furthermore, when the 
market is opened to foreign firms, social welfare is higher when both firms set prices than in other competitions. 
Keywords 
Operations research; Game Theory; social welfare; market opening 
1. Introduction
The analysis of mixed oligopoly models has received significant attention in recent years. We can find such mixed 
markets in industries such as telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as well as services 
including hospitals, banking and education. The usual models consider either competitions on quantities or 
competitions on prices (see, for instance, DeFraja and Delbono (1989), Hashimzade et al. (2007)). 
The internationalization markets is also a issue of interested. For instance, Fjel and Pal (1996) consider a mixed 
oligopoly model in which a public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. 
Also, usually, the literature focus attention on models with firms producing imperfect substitutable, or differentiated, 
goods, and pay less attention to models with firms producing complementary goods (see Ohnishi (2010a) and Ohnishi 
(2010b)).  
Ohnishi (2010a) considers mixed duopoly models with firms producing imperfect substitutable goods, and compares 
the equilibrium outcomes of the results obtained in domestic and international competitions. Ohnishi (2010b) study 
the same issue, but by considering that the firms produce complementary goods.  
Ferreira and Ferreira (2018) extend the work of Ohnishi (2010a) to a triopoly market and with an imported tariff fixed 
by the home government.  
In this paper, we analyse, separately, the model in which the state-owned public firm sets the price and the private 
firm chooses the output production; and the model in which the state-owned public firm sets the output production 
and the private firm chooses the price (for models with different decision variables, see, for instance, Ohori (2014)). 
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We also study, separately, domestic markets and international markets. We solve and compare the four models. In 
addition, our results are compared with the findings of price-price competition model studied by Ohnishi (2010). This 
paper contributes to the understanding of the implications of firms’ decisions on social welfare. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 and 3, we study, respectively, the domestic and 
international price-quantity-setting models. In Section 4 and 5, we study, respectively, the domestic and international 
quantity-price-setting models. Sections 6 recall the results for domestic and international price-price-setting models. 
In Section 7, we compare the results of the different market structures. 
 
2. Domestic mixed duopoly: price-quantity competition 
 
We consider a market competition with one state-owned public firm SF  and one domestic private firm DF , that 
produce complementary goods. We assume that the representative consumer maximizes 
( ),S D S S D DU q q p q p q− − , 
where iq  is the quantity of the good produced by firm iF  and ip  is the its price, with ,i S D= 1. The function U is 
assumed to be quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in Sq  and Dq : 
( ) ( ) ( )2 21, 22S D S D S S D DU q q a q q q bq q q= + − + + , 
where 0a >  and ( )1,0b∈ −  is a measure of the degree of complementary among goods produced by both firms. 
For simplicity, we assume 1a =  0.5b = − . So, the direct demand is characterized by 
( )2 3 23i i jq p p= − − , 
and, therefore, the inverse demand function is given by 
11
2i i j
p q q= − + , 
where , ,i j S D=  with i j≠ . 
The profit function iπ  of firm iF  is given by 
( )i i ip c qπ = − , 
where 0c >  is the marginal production cost of each firm. We assume 1/ 3 1c< <  to assure that the production outputs 
and prices are positive. 
Domestic social welfare W, which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus CS and production surplus, is given by 
S DW CS π π= + + , 
where 
( )( )
( )
2 2
2 2
2 3 1
3
1     .
2
S S D D S D
S S D D
CS p p p p p p
q q q q
= + + + − −
= − +
 
The state-owned public firm SF  aims to maximize domestic social welfare W, while domestic private firm DF  aims 
to maximize its own profit Dπ . 
In this section, we suppose that the state-owned public firm chooses price Sp  and the domestic private firm sets the 
production output Dq . 
The state-owned public firm SF  solves the optimization problem max
Sp
W , and the private firm solves the optimization 
problem max
D
Dq
π . By solving the system 
                                                 
1 Throughtout the paper, we use the notation subscript S to refer the state-owned public firm and D to refer to the 
domestic private firm. 
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2(2 3 ) 0
3
2(2 1) 0
2
S D
S
S DD
D
p p cW
p
q q c
q
π
+ −∂ = − =∂
 − + −∂ = =
 ∂
 
we find the optimal quantities2 
, 3 1
2
H p q
S
cq − −=  and , 1H p qDq
− = , 
and the prices of each good 
( ), 2 1H p qSp c− = −  and , 1H p qDp c− = − . 
Furthermore, firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are as follows: 
( )2, 1H p qS cπ − = − − , ( )
2, 1H p qD cπ
− = − , 
( )2, 3 1
2
H p q cCS −
−
= , ( )
2
, 3 1
2
H p q cW −
−
= . 
We note that the domestic private firm gets higher profits than the state-owned public firm. 
 
3. International mixed duopoly: price-quantity competition 
 
In this section, we consider a competition between a domestic state-owned public firm SF , that chooses price Sp , 
and a foreign private firm FF , that sets the production output Fq . Both firms produce complementary goods. 
Domestic social welfare is now given by 
SW CS π= + . 
As in the previous section, we solve the system 
4( ) 0
3
2(2 1) 0
2
S
S
F F D
F
c pW
p
q q c
q
π
−∂ = =∂
∂ − + − = =
 ∂
. 
Thus, we get the optimal quantities 
( ), 10 1
7
I p q
S
c
q −
−
=  and ( ), 6 1
7
I p q
F
c
q −
−
= , 
and the prices of each good 
,I p q
Sp c
− =  and ( ), 6 1
7
I p q
F
c
p −
−
= . 
Furthermore, firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are as follows: 
, 0I p qSπ
− = , ( )
2
, 36 1
49
I p q
F
c
π −
−
= , 
( )2, 38 1
49
I p q cCS −
−
= , ( )
2
, 38 1
49
I p q cW −
−
= . 
We note that the foreign private firm gets higher profits than the state-owned public firm. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Throughtout the paper, we use the notation superscript H and I, to refer the domestic and international competition, 
respectively; and we use the notation superscript p-q, q-p and p-p to refer the price-quantity-setting, quantity-price-
setting and price-price-setting competitions, respectively. 
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4. Domestic mixed duopoly: quantity-price competition 
 
Now, we consider a similar domestic market competition as in Section 2, with the following differences: the domestic 
state-owned public firm SF  chooses production output Sq , and the domestic private firm DF  sets price Dp . Domestic 
social welfare is given by 
S DW CS π π= + + . 
The state-owned public firm SF  solves the optimization problem max
Sq
W , and the private firm solves the optimization 
problem max
D
Dp
π . By solving the system 
2(2 2 2) 0
3
2( 4 2 3) 0
3
S D
S
S DD
D
q q cW
q
p p c
p
π
− + −∂ = − =∂
 + − −∂ = − =
 ∂
 
we find the optimal quantities 
( ), 3 1
2
H q p
S
c
q −
−
=  and , 1H q pDq c
− = − , 
and the prices of each good 
,H q p
Sp c
− =  and , 3
4
H q p
D
cp − += . 
Furthermore, firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are as follows: 
, 0H q pSπ
− = , 
( )2, 3 1
4
H q p
D
c
π −
−
= , 
( )2, 7 1
8
H q p cCS −
−
= , ( )
2
, 7 1
8
H q p cW −
−
= . 
We note that the domestic private firm gets higher profits than the state-owned public firm. 
 
5. International mixed duopoly: quantity-price competition 
 
In this section, we consider a competition between a domestic state-owned public firm SF , that chooses production 
output Sq , and a foreign private firm FF , that sets the price Fp . Both firms produce complementary goods. Domestic 
social welfare is given by 
SW CS π= + . 
As in the previous section, we solve the system 
1 0
2( 4 2 3) 0
2
S
S
S FF
F
W q c
q
p p c
p
π
∂ = − − + =∂
 + − −∂ = − =
 ∂
. 
Thus, we get the optimal quantities 
, 1I q pSq c
− = −  and ( ), 6 1
7
I q p
F
c
q −
−
= , 
and the prices of each good 
, 3 4
7
I q p
S
cp − +=  and , 9 5
14
I q p
F
cp − += . 
Furthermore, firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are as follows: 
( )2, 3 1
7
I q p
S
c
π −
−
= , ( )
2
, 27 1
49
I q p
F
c
π −
−
= , 
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( )2, 43 1
98
I q p cCS −
−
= , ( )
2
, 85 1
98
I q p cW −
−
= . 
We note that the foreign private firm gets higher profits than the state-owned public firm. 
 
6. Price-price competition 
 
Ohnishi (2010) studied domestic (resp. international) Bertrand mixed duopoly competition, in which a state-owned 
public firm and a domestic (resp. foreign) private firm produce complementary goods. From his paper we get 
( )( ), 6 1 1
7
H p p
S
c c
π −
− −
= , ( )
2
, 48 1
49
H p p
D
c
π −
−
= , 
( )2, 37 1
49
H p p cCS −
−
= , ( )
2
, 43 1
49
H p p cW −
−
= , 
, 0I p pSπ
− = , 
( )2, 3 1
4
I p p
F
c
π −
−
= , 
( )2, 7 1
8
I p p cCS −
−
= , ( )
2
, 7 1
8
I p p cW −
−
= . 
 
7. Comparisons 
 
In this section, we compare some of the results presented in the previous sections. Next proposition follows directly 
from the results above. 
 
Proposition 1. At equilibrium, we have the following: 
, , ,H p q H p p H q p
S S Sπ π π
− − −< < , , , ,I p q I p p I q pS S Sπ π π
− − −= < , 
, , ,H q p H p p H p q
D D Dπ π π
− − −< < , , , ,I q p I p q I p pF F Fπ π π
− − −< < , 
, , ,H p p H q p H p qCS CS CS− − −< < , , , ,I q p I p q I p pCS CS CS− − −< < , 
, , ,H q p H p p H p qW W W− − −< < , , , ,I p q I q p I p pW W W− − −< < . 
 
Proposition 1 states that (i) in the domestic competition, social welfare is higher when the state-owned public firm sets 
price and the domestic private firm sets production outputs than in other competitions; (ii) in the international 
competition, that is when the market is opened, social welfare is higher when both firms set prices than in other 
competitions. 
 
8. Numerical example 
 
In this section, we present a numerical example for different values of the parameter c that represents the unit 
production costs. This numerical example illustrates the previous results. 
 
0.5c =  0.9c =  
Private firm State-pwned public firm Private firm State-pwned public firm 
, 0.25H p qDπ
− =  , 0.25H p qSπ
− = −  , 0.01H p qDπ
− =  , 0.01H p qSπ
− = −  
, 0.1875H q pDπ
− =  , 0H q pSπ
− =  , 0.0075H q pDπ
− =  , 0H q pSπ
− =  
, 0.2449H p pDπ
− =  , 0.2143H p pSπ
− = −  , 0.0098H p pDπ
− =  , 0.0086H p pSπ
− = −  
, 0.1837I p qFπ
− =  , 0I p qSπ
− =  , 0.0073I p qFπ
− =  , 0I p qSπ
− =  
, 0.1378I q pFπ
− =  , 0.1071I q pSπ
− =  , 0.0055I q pFπ
− =  , 0.0043I q pSπ
− =  
1535
Proceedings of the International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Operations Management 
Bangkok, Thailand, March 5-7, 2019 
© IEOM Society International 
, 0.1875I p pFπ
− =  , 0I p pSπ
− =  , 0.0075I p pFπ
− =  , 0I p pSπ
− =  
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